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The paper presents an up to date analysis of the French 
local government system and its potential for realisation 
of local democracy. It is structured into three sections in 
which the pros and cons, the improvements and shilly-shal-
lying delineate local democracy in France. First, through 
the restricted French vision that participative democracy 
only supplements, not enriches representative democracy. 
Second, the structural and organisational crisis of repre-
sentative local democracy will be examined against the 
context of continuing process of decentralisation. Finally, 
the paper concludes that the way local democracy is being 
defined and operated in France today raises more ques-
tions than it provides answers. Whichever the point of view 
is taken, several questions need answers. To which degree 
are representatives answerable? Can participative democ-
racy end up in no democracy?
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1. Introduction
Since the 19th century, the successive constitutions of the French Repub-
lic have clearly shown a continuous hostility to giving the people tools of 
direct democracy despite what Jean-Jacques Rousseau described as the 
Ideal State in reference to the rural communities of Switzerland (Lands-
gemeinden) and their long tradition of self-government and direct democ-
racy (Le Contrat Social). The fact is that the French have kept a long 
memory of Napoleon Bonaparte’s plebiscites as so many symbols of Césa-
risme. President De Gaulle’s philosophy about power only ensured the 
continued existence of referendums-plebiscites dedicated to the head of 
state. This spectre of plebiscites explains why the 2008 constitutional re-
form was reluctant to introduce the right to popular initiative in referenda 
at the national level. In fact, it only provides for a referendum based on a 
shared initiative that is very unlikely to succeed: indeed the bill must be 
introduced by one fifth of all 925 MPs1 and supported by one tenth of all 
registered voters, i.e. 4.5 million citizens!
On the other hand, in France as much as in other democratic states, rep-
resentative democracy is said to be simply outdated or its reputation is 
under severe criticism. Alternatives to representative democracy have 
been experienced under the various forms of so-called opinion democra-
cy, participative democracy, or even direct democracy: as if inherited from 
the ideal type of Ancient Greece. In fact – and this is fortunate for the 
most vulnerable members of Western societies – only some means of the 
Ancient Greek regime have inspired lawmakers in contemporary Europe 
– in the view of reviving democracy at large. However, what is in crisis is 
not so much representative democracy in itself as the official image that 
politicians and journalists tend to give it. 
Such an endless debate creates a fake competition between representa-
tive and participative democracy, especially at the local level, particularly 
in France, although it is obvious that they are supplementary and not 
in opposition to one another: citizens’ participation in the management 
1  The Parliament is composed of 348 Senators and 577 Representatives in the As-
semblée Nationale.
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of local affairs could be considered as the corner-stone of a compelling 
evolution towards the inclusion of ‘outsiders’ – not contenders – into 
decision-making processes. Keeping in mind that a democratic regime 
consists of checks and balances, men and women equally able to elect 
their best possible representatives who are empowered to answer their 
needs and expectations, this paper will be structured into three sections 
in which the pros and cons, the improvements and shilly-shallying, de-
lineate local democracy in France: first through the restricted French 
vision that participative democracy only supplements, not enriches rep-
resentative democracy; secondly the structural and organisational crisis 
of representative local democracy will have to be examined against the 
context of continuing process of decentralisation; finally we will be some-
what forced to conclude that the way local democracy is being defined 
and operated in France raises more questions than answers. To which 
extent are representatives answerable? Can participative democracy end 
up in no democracy?  
2.  Local Participative Democracy as a Mere 
Supplement to Representative Democracy
If local authorities are praised as ‘the foundation of democracy’, ‘the lab-
oratory for democracy improvements’ France should rank high on the list 
of the ‘most democratic’ countries in the world giving the size of its local 
government units. The fact is that France rather suffers from a curious 
and unique syndrome among European countries. While the national of-
fice for statistics (INSEE) shows that 95 per cent of the French popu-
lation live in urban areas, ‘under the influence of cities’ (INSEE, 2011) 
current regulation about local government responsibilities and legitimacy 
seems to ignore that urbanization often expands beyond the historical 
borders of communes that remain the unchallenged basis for any local 
government reform. We have the smallest commune (Rochefourchat, in 
the Southeast) with only one inhabitant. We even have communes with 
no inhabitants at all: six ‘dead communes’ (mortes pour la France), totally 
destroyed in WW1 are kept ‘alive’ and the mayor is appointed by central 
government’s representative (préfet). On the contrary, Paris is the biggest 
French city with over 2.2 million, but is still much smaller than its British 
or German counterparts that represent their whole urban regions. The av-
erage size of French communes is 1,750 inhabitants while the EU average 
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size is 5,130 inhabitants. So far successive attempts to merge municipal-
ities have failed to overcome the strong sense of identity that citizens are 
said to develop in smaller units.




NUTS 2  
Regions
NUTS 3  
Départements
Local Authority  
Units Communes
European Union 501.25 271 1,303 121,601
France 64.70 26 100 36,682
Germany 81.75 39 429 12,379
Italy 60.39 21 107 8,101
United-Kingdom 62.04 37 133 10,664
Source: Eurostat
Median population in a French commune is 423 inhabitants, as opposed 
to 2,300 inhabitants in Italy and 11,000 in Belgium. More than 31,500 
communes have less than 2,000 inhabitants (‘rural’ communes), 255 are 
over 30,000, and only 11 are over 200,000 inhabitants (Sénat, 2009). 
As the French example shows physical closeness of representatives is not 
enough to ensure a better representation of the communities’ interests 
and their involvement in local politics. As far as the people’s involvement 
in the management of local affairs is concerned, Switzerland is certainly 
‘top of the European class’ since it has experienced citizens’ direct partici-
pation in decision-making processes since the first half of the 19th century. 
Since 1947, the Italian Constitution has provided for three direct democ-
racy mechanisms: bills to be proposed through popular initiative (Art. 
71), consultative constitutional referenda, and referenda that can repeal 
a law (Art. 75). The prize list could include Germany after re-unification 
(municipal and Land referenda), Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Slovenia, which have added all three direct democracy processes to their 
constitutions at the time of their democratic transition. Similarly, citizens’ 
popular initiative has been included in the Lisbon Treaty since April 1st, 
2012; the trouble is that the mechanism comes up against so many obsta-
cles that it seems more theoretical than real. 
Apart from the 1793 Constitution (Constitution montagnarde of the First 
Republic), which gave the people a right to popular initiative and veto 
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that had never been enacted, local democracy was restricted to the repre-
sentative model in all successive regimes. 
It took the notion of local democracy ten years after the 1981–1982 de-
centralization reforms to make its first appearance in the constitutional 
framework. Popular participation in councils’ decision-making processes 
or consultation was simply forbidden after two successive judgements by 
the Supreme Administrative Court.2 Thus, an Act of Parliament had to 
be passed to officially seek people’s advice about local policies. The 1992 
Act (Loi pour l’orientation territoriale de la République) tackles the right of 
local communities to be better informed and to be asked for their advice 
through consultative referenda only. Budgetary documents must be put 
at disposal, decisions made in the field of economic public intervention 
must be officially published, direct consultative processes are created but 
strictly supervised, and customers of local services can be called into con-
sultative committees to have their say.
Again, it took another ten years for citizens to be more closely included 
into the making of local decisions through area-meetings (conseils de quar-
tier). Interestingly, at the same time, the rights of opposition party groups 
in local councils were reinforced and local councillors’ conditions for elec-
tion and status improved (Loi du 27 février 2002 relative à la démocratie 
de proximité). The mechanisms of participative democracy have recently 
multiplied: ‘public debate’, ‘citizens’ workshops’, ‘participative budget’ are 
becoming common phrases in newspapers and political speeches. How-
ever, France is still testing local direct democracy: the 2003 Constitution-
al Reform Act opened up the possibility for local councils to hold deci-
sion-making referenda in restricted circumstances. Then only indirectly, 
the 2004 Charter on Environment Protection tackled local democracy3 
in relation to the very topics it dealt with. The 2012 implementing legis-
lation4 proposed to test the possibility of using participative democracy 
devices to improve the impact of public enquiries on the elaboration of 
some categories of by-laws and ministerial decrees, for an eighteen-month 
period from 2013 onwards. In July 2013, a report to the Ministry of Ur-
2   Conseil d’Etat, arrêt «Commune d’Aigre», 7th April 1905; arrêt «Commune de 
Brugnens», 15th January, 1909.
3  Article 7 of the Charter: Everyone is entitled to free access to environment-related 
information that is held by public authorities; they are entitled to take part in the public 
authorities’ policy-making that may have impact on the environment.
4  LOI n° 2012–1460 du 27 décembre 2012 relative à la mise en œuvre du principe de 
participation du public défini à l’article 7 de la Charte de l’environnement
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ban Policy on citizenship and empowerment of inhabitants in poor areas 
was titled Ça ne se fera plus sans nous (Never again without us) (Bacqué, 
Mechmache, 2013) expressing acutely that the traditional tools of citi-
zens’ participation as known for the last twenty years have never been be-
yond mere exercise of public relations or consultation. Sadly, the appall-
ing Sivens dam affair in the Southwest has illustrated this critical report, 
when in November 2014 a young man died in a demonstration against 
a planned reservoir to be built on the protected wet lands by a publicly 
owned company with the approval of the local (provincial) council5. No 
wonder why the news was broken as un drame de la décision publique à 
la française (A tragedy of the French-style decision-making process, Le 
Monde, 21th November, 2014): ‘The tragedy reveals weaknesses in the 
management of public decision-making in France … (which very much) 
depends on the balance of political powers on the spot’. In the aftermath, 
President Hollande proposed to the Conférence Environnementale (Nation-
al Conference on the Environment) a new model of participative democ-
racy which would be based on local referenda. This is to say that until now 
participative democracy in France has implied an unfinished business of 
allowing local communities to take part in the life of their own areas. 
So what does participative democracy consist of? If we reckon that coun-
try and city planning are its most favoured and complex playfields, we can 
find the three commonly assumed aspects of participative democracy – 
information, consultation, and dialogue that only reinforce the idea that 
participative democracy is mainly seen as a supplement to representative 
democracy. 
As said before, the number of tools for citizens’ participation is expand-
ing in France as elsewhere and they mirror the local politicians’ various 
views if not contradicting expectations: some tools are genuinely made to 
deepen the case for more democracy, others are created to control and 
adapt the local structures to the law, while still others are definitely purely 
instrumental in the hands of local politics (Bacqué, Sintomer, 2009; Blon-
diaux, 2008). Some of these tools are becoming commonplace, like ref-
erenda, public enquiries and the various forms of mandatory or voluntary 
meetings for inhabitants and voluntary sector (comité de quartier, conseil de 
développement) or their representatives (conseil des jeunes, conseil municipal 
des enfants, conseil des anciens, conseils des résidents étrangers, commissions 
extra-municipales), etc. Some remain exceptional, like people’s initiatives, 
5  Conseil départemental du Tarn.
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citizens’ juries, participative budgets and public proceedings (assises, fo-
rums citoyens, conseil communal de concertation, conférences de consensus, 
ateliers urbains de proximité ...) – contemporary local politics and policies 
are required to use them as mandatory steps within the decision-making 
processes of the time for both management and democracy reasons. The 
politics of citizens’ participation is supposed to give a larger number of 
laymen access to public information from and negotiation with those ‘in 
charge and who know about’ on the one hand, and to guarantee easier 
acceptance and more efficient implementation of public intervention on 
the other (Blondiaux, Sintomer, 2002).
Participative democracy is expected to achieve numerous goals such as 
improving local management, social cohesion and democracy at large, 
and is based on a kind of ideology of closeness (la proximité), enshrined in 
the Act on démocratie de proximité6 – sort of localism – in order to enlist 
citizens and raise local communities’ interest in immediate and down-
to-earth stakes so that local politics become a daily routine (Lefebvre, 
Nonjon, 2003). It remains to be seen whether it is no more than a new 
widely used fashionable word though without any particular meaning or, 
on the contrary, it signals that a powerful groundswell is changing the way 
political legitimacy and magnitude are developing across French society. 
If we agree that it is a notion, it expresses a break into the symbolic inher-
itance of the French political philosophy, which has for centuries insisted 
on indexing legitimacy on distance and separation: ‘the general public’s 
interest is different from a collection of private interests; the State is sep-
arated from civil society, good and rational bureaucracy is untouched by 
face to face relationships’ (Le Bart, 2007). Since it is all about ‘getting 
together’ the notion is deemed to help reviving local democracy and to 
reinforce its legitimacy. 
Whatever its merits are, ‘close democracy’ as a legal mechanism compris-
es at least two limits: one is often quoted as the NIMBY phenomena: in-
dividually represented private or vested interests prevent the community 
from trying any kind of collective solution. The second limit is that it may 
discourage or make people feel guilty because they are facing a problem 
that exceeds their local authority’s area and power while they are not giv-
en the means to call upon other tiers of government authorities (ADELS, 
2004). 
6  Loi n° 2002–276 du 27 février 2002 relative à la démocratie de proximité.
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As a short conclusion on the state of the art of participative democracy in 
France, one can insist on the fact that these tools have not been created to 
be efficient. The Parliament carefully handled them in the view of making 
them non-binding for local authorities showing its definite distrust in par-
ticipation processes (Feldmann, Guiselin, 2011). Local referenda, consul-
tations, and petitions remain optional for local councils. The creation and 
functioning of area committees, citizens’ forums, local assemblies, etc. is 
left in the hands and at the good will of local councillors. 
For example, only in bigger cities – over 80,000 inhabitants – conseils de 
quartier must be created. In smaller communes – 20,000 inhabitants or 
more – the establishment, functioning, chairmanship, and design of their 
area-basis are left to the municipal council’s decision. They may be com-
pletely informal in towns under 20,000. Interestingly, the management 
of contracted or in-house local services (water, garbage collection, trans-
portation, etc.) is now under a rather restrictive scrutiny of consultative 
committees (commissions consultatives des services publics locaux) that gather 
appointed councillors and representatives of the voluntary sector in all 
three tiers of local government (regions, départements and communes over 
10,000 inhabitants): the Commissions will only be consulted for new con-
tracted or in-house services. 
That is to say that these structures can do no harm! The reason why the 
Parliament decided about non-binding mechanisms for participative de-
mocracy lies in the system of accumulation of mandates (Paoletti, 1998). 
French local councillors, mayors, presidents of regional or provincial 
councils can also be members of the Senate or of the Assemblée nationale.7 
They refuse to undergo what they see as a limitation to representative 
democracy and thus have limited, as much as possible, citizens’ capability 
to express their views directly. They want to keep for themselves their de-
cision-making powers and allow for means of direct expression only when 
they decide so within their local councils. 
7  After the 2012 general elections, 476 out of 577 members of the National Assembly 
(82 per cent) and 267 out of 348 senators (77 per cent) hold at least one local mandate on 
top of their national mandate. 
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3.  An Immature Representative Local  
Democracy in Crisis
First of all, one needs to bear in mind that within the local authority’s 
executive power the French mayor holds the most prestigious seat and 
more importantly, the largest share of power due to his/her own personal 
responsibilities as the embodied executive power and also as the repre-
sentative officer of the central government for registration, election roll 
and organisation, immigration police, etc. As we will explain further on, 
the voting system of blocked lists mixes the pluri-nominal majority vote 
in two rounds with some proportional representation. Since the 2014 mu-
nicipal elections, this system has been extended to all communes over 
1,000 inhabitants8 whereas ‘panachage’ and individual candidacy has 
been the rule in small communities under 3,500 inhabitants. The 2013 
local government reform act definitively reassesses the strong position of 
the mayor as a ‘local monarch’ (Mabileau, 1993) and silences the opposi-
tion party groups: the winning list is granted 50 per cent of the total seats; 
the remaining seats are distributed among the lists that gained at least 5 
per cent of the votes cast including the winning list. 
Even if the mayor is indirectly elected by the municipal council on its first 
meeting following the election day, most of the time, though not always, 
he/she is the first name on the winning list. Given the voting system that 
provides a real bonus to the winning list, there is no excitement about the 
name of the ‘mayor to be’… unless the leader of the winning list decides 
not to stand for the mayoral election and to let another name become the 
mayor instead. That is to say that incidentally citizens who voted for the 
winning list may not be represented by the declared candidate! 
Moreover, the French ‘disease’ of accumulation of national and local man-
dates (as an MP or Senator and simultaneously as a mayor or president 
of a regional or second-tier council – le Département) has been gradually 
cured. The 2014 Act definitively forbids MEPs, MPs, and Senators from 
holding executive powers in local government but it will not be imple-
mented until the 2017 general elections.
Two more reforms were imposed in the 2014 local ballots to improve the 
representativeness of local authorities: gender equality and direct elec-
tions of councils for joint inter-communal bodies. 
8  There are 3,732 communes with less than 1,000 inhabitants, which together have 
2.7 million inhabitants.
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In order to ensure gender equality, the lists of candidates must contain 
an equal number of women and men, alternately ranking (one man, one 
woman or conversely), in the 6,550 communes over 1,000 inhabitants so 
that the number of women in politics should increase by about 16,000. 
Regarding direct election of inter-communal councils, for the first time in 
the 2014 local elections, citizens directly elected their representatives in 
the municipal and inter-communal joint councils by one ballot: from the 
blocked lists the first names in the elected lists were also to become mem-
bers of the related inter-communal council. The government prided itself 
that the 2013 reform act also provided for the first ever direct election of 
these joint bodies through municipal elections. In fact, the same provision 
was incorporated in the 2010 reform act under the Fillon Government as 
President Sarkozy elaborated it. The 2010 Act had been abolished after 
the swing in the 2012 presidential and general elections. In small com-
munes, fewer than 1,000 inter-communal councillors are members of the 
municipal councils according to the classical order (mayor, first and sec-
ond deputy-mayors). In fact, as citizens have no choice when choosing 
members of the inter-communal councils, both the new system and the 
previous one, which has been in existence since the end of the 19th centu-
ry, end up with practically the same result. 
Can we expect the developing inter-communal system to become really 
democratic at a time when it is transferred more and more responsibili-
ties and financial means from its member-communes? The question must 
be asked since the system has been repeatedly criticized for its lack of 
legitimacy and transparency (Caillosse et al., 2001; Desage, Guéranger, 
2010). It is sufficient to explain that since the end of the 1990s Parlia-
mentary reports, debates, and academic research for local government 
associations and political lobbies have endlessly pointed at the same fail-
ure to deliver democratically controlled policies while chairmanship and 
executive powers for such councils have never accounted for the calcula-
tion of accumulated mandates. The reason is that mayors, whether they 
are presidents or vice-presidents of inter-communal bodies or not, do not 
want them to be fully regarded as local authorities and endowed with a 
status that could impinge on communal sovereignty. 
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4.  Further Questions to Be Raised Rather  
Than Clear Answers to Be Given
To sum up our critical review of local democracy in France, we will ana-
lyse both representative and participative aspects under two dimensions. 
First, we will deal with the issue of representative through democratic 
control over councillors and councils’ work, then we will assess the real 
part played by participative democracy within the local government ma-
chinery. 
Representative democracy and the control over councils’ work: how much are 
elected councillors answerable? Local government responsibilities and func-
tions seem to be definitely entangled due to the implementation of the 
principle of freedom of administration which is allocated to all three lo-
cal authority categories, the commune, the département, and the region, 
but not to joint bodies (établissement public de cooperation intercommunale, 
EPCI) which have only delegated powers. Functions and, consequently, 
human resources tend to be multiplied and duplicated not only among 
local councils but also between local and central government. Institutions 
are literally pilled as a result of institutional reform-policies that have cre-
ated more structures on top of one another “without ever abolishing, clari-
fying or re-organizing” (quoted from the report for the Local Government 
Reform Bill, 2009). Moreover, the territorial structure of communes as 
well as of EPCIs is crumbling, despite recent reforms that tend to control 
and rationalize the number of joint bodies. Finally, most of these organi-
sations lack legitimacy and direct accountability before citizens since their 
councils mainly end up in coalition governments as defined behind closed 
doors. Indeed, French and foreign academics as much as parliamentary 
reports (Balladur 2008 Commission Report to the President and Mauroy 
2000 Commission Report to the Prime Minister; 2009 Senate Report) 
have repeatedly expressed their concern about the deepening crisis of the 
French local government system which is traditionally based on a mixed 
machinery of three-tiered local authorities and numerous bodies with no 
local authority legal status in between. 
A research project studying 344 legal actions against local authorities at 
the Administrative Court in Lille from September 2008 to September 
2009 showed that only 36 (10.5 per cent) were raised by the prefect, while 
215 (63 per cent) were initiated by individuals and 44 (13 per cent) by 
companies (Contamin, 2011). Beyond the rule of the game, the prefects’ 
restrained room for manoeuvre in the field of legal control over local au-
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thorities (and reduced number of qualified staff!) seems to reduce the 
importance of formal scrutiny, which is, nevertheless, one of their main 
raisons d’être. Since political control over local government remains large-
ly impossible in France due to the voting system as explained above on the 
one hand, and to the constitutionally expressed libertés communales that 
protect local authorities and their personnel on the other, it is a paradox 
that political control seems to develop in France through legal action. The 
decentralisation reform has evolved within a presidential style and regime 
for local authorities that provide citizens with few means to influence lo-
cal policies politically. As we have already seen, citizens’ involvement and 
participation in local affairs remain at the good will of the council, espe-
cially of the mayor.
As a whole, the ‘municipal presidentialism’ model as it has developed 
since the last quarter of the 19th century under the Third Republic, only 
expanded into councils of regions and départements through transferred 
executive powers and resources to the council presidents personally. It 
was a simple implementation of the devolution of powers to the President 
of the Republic under the 1958 Constitution: the mayor and presidents 
are not answerable to their local councils which mainly play the role of 
ratifying their decisions. Thus, political control is restricted to recurring 
election process not forgetting the impact of the ‘nationalisation’ rule of 
local elections. 
Participative democracy: Participation without democracy? Participation 
against democracy? What are the aims of using semi-direct democracy 
tools? What use is being made of them? Is there any risk of splitting the 
society into two opposed groups over sensitive issues? For sure, since the 
decentralisation reform, a wider number of local politicians have been 
called upon and intervened. Nevertheless, we have explained that partic-
ipation has been established on ad hoc basis and it still depends on the 
good will of mayors, as the case of local referenda shows (Paoletti, 2007). 
For that reason, new decentralisation reform bills have been passed at 
top speed since the end of 2012 as parts of President Hollande’s electoral 
manifesto. The trouble is that they have often been against the Senate’s 
advice, although the upper chamber is constitutionally designed as the 
representative body for local authorities and local interests in the French 
Parliament. 
First, it was about abolishing the 2010 Act on the creation of conseillers 
territoriaux (local councillors accumulating responsibilities for both re-
gional and provincial councils and meeting for both tiers of local govern-
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ment). Then there was a need to clarify the distribution of responsibili-
ties between each type of local authority and between central and local 
government. The Government has decided to create new local authori-
ties (métropoles) as a sort of unitary councils for major urban areas over 
400,000 inhabitants that could become autonomous enclaves detached 
from their département and region areas in the long run.9 From 1st Jan-
uary 2015, the inter-communal bodies (communautés urbaines) around 
Bordeaux, Brest, Grenoble, Lille, Montpellier, Nantes, Rennes, Rouen, 
Strasbourg, and Toulouse have become metropolises with larger respon-
sibilities, voluntarily or not delegated from communes and from central 
government. On the same day, Lyon Métropole urban area was established 
as a new local authority that endorses delegated responsibilities from the 
Rhône Département on top of the tasks devolved from its member-com-
munes.10 The Maptam Act has created two other new métropoles with a 
special status: Grand Paris and Aix-Marseille to start on 1st January 2016. 
Smaller urban areas can be turned into pôles métropolitains. 
Nice area is the only métropole that was created as early as 1st January 
2012. On the 17th November 2011, while a member of the Fillon Govern-
ment (2007-2012), Christian Estrosi, the mayor for Nice city council and 
president of Nice-Communauté urbaine was granted the first ever status 
as Métropole Nice Côte d’Azur by the Minister of the Interior according to 
the 2010 local government reform Act which was abolished in 2013. This 
status remains to be revised to conform with the new provisions of the 
2014 Maptam Act. 
More controversial and much more resented, even by members of the 
Left majority group in the French Parliament is the reform of the regions 
in continental France. Finally, despite lengthy consultations and negotia-
tions, 13 enlarged regions will replace the 21 of those that dated back to 
the 1970s. The final decision was President Hollande’s, who announced 
the late restructuring into a still smaller number after the Government Bill 
had announced the establishment of 14 regions at the beginning of 2014. 
Facing solid inertia in the structure and devolution processes of local 
responsibilities and powers, tools for participative democracy have only 
brought cosmetic change so far. The traditional division of labour among 
9  Loi de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropo-
les (loi Maptam), 27th January 2014. By-laws signed up by the Minister of the Interior de-
lineate each métropole. 
10  Décret en Conseil des ministres, 17th December, 2014. Métropole de Lyon.
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local politicians is not questioned in-depth and participative democracy 
can still be set against representative democracy at the local level in Fran-
ce (Lefebvre, 2012). 
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LOCAL DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE:  
IMPROVEMENTS AND SHILLY-SHALLYING
Summary
The paper presents an up to date analysis of the French local government system 
and its potential for realisation of local democracy. It is structured into three 
sections in which the pros and cons, the improvements and shilly-shallying de-
lineate local democracy in France. First, through the restricted French vision 
that participative democracy only supplements, not enriches representative de-
mocracy. Second, the structural and organisational crisis of representative local 
democracy will be examined against the context of continuing process of decen-
tralisation. Finally, the paper concludes that the way local democracy is being 
defined and operated in France today raises more questions than it provides 
answers. Whichever the point of view is taken, several questions need answers. To 
which degree are representatives answerable? Can participative democracy end 
up into no democracy?
Key words: local government – France, local democracy, participative and rep-
resentative democracy
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LOKALNA DEMOKRACIJA U FRANCUSKOJ:  
POBOLJŠANJA I NEODLUČNOST
Sažetak 
Analiziraju se suvremeni razvoj francuskog sustava lokalne samouprave i njegov 
potencijal za ostvarenje lokalne demokracije. U tri poglavlja prikazuju se dobre 
i loše strane te poboljšanja i neodlučnost u razvoju francuske lokalne demokraci-
je. Najprije se razmatra ograničeno francusko shvaćanje da participativna 
demokracija samo nadopunjava, a ne obogaćuje predstavničku demokraciju. U 
drugom se poglavlju razmatra strukturalna i organizacijska kriza lokalne pred-
stavničke demokracije u kontekstu stalnog procesa decentralizacije. Način na 
koji se danas definira i upravlja lokalnom demokracijom u Francuskoj postavlja 
mnogo više pitanja no što daje odgovora. Koje god stajalište se zauzme, postavl-
jaju se bar dva važna pitanja: do koje su mjere odgovorni lokalni politički pred-
stavnici; je li moguće da participativna demokracija završi tako da demokracije 
više ne bude?
Ključne riječi: lokalna samouprava – Francuska, lokalna demokracija, partic-
ipativna i predstavnička demokracija
